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AbstrAct
Realism posits that strong states use compulsory power to influence the behavior of weaker ones. 
If true, then U.S. policy toward Mexico on a key national security issue such as drugs should illustrate 
that claim and policy outcomes should reflect U.S. preferences. Yet, in exploring a series of bilat-
eral case studies, this article suggests that unilateral U.S. government initiatives do not achieve 
their specified goals. Rather, we argue that Mexico effectively employs a series of “strangulation 
strategies.” These derail U.S. initiatives and –under specific conditions– result in institutional 
agreements that proscribe certain forms of behavior and reduce future U.S. autonomy.
Key words: drugs, autonomy, institutionalism, unilateralism, bilateralism, strangulation strat-
egies, United States, Mexico.
resumen
El realismo sostiene que los Estados fuertes utilizan su poder de coacción para influir en el com-
portamiento de los débiles. Si esto es verdad, entonces la política estadunidense sobre México en 
un tema clave de la seguridad nacional como es el de las drogas debería ilustrar que las políticas 
públicas y las reclamaciones en la materia tendrían que reflejar las preferencias de Estados Uni-
dos. No obstante, al explorar un conjunto de estudios de caso bilaterales este artículo sugiere 
que las iniciativas unilaterales del gobierno estadunidense no consiguen alcanzar sus metas tal 
como fueron formuladas. Por el contrario, argumentamos que México emplea con mucha efica-
cia una serie de “estrategias de estrangulación”. Éstas hacen descarrilar a las iniciativas de Esta-
dos Unidos y –bajo ciertas condiciones– terminan en acuerdos institucionales que prohíben al-
gunas formas de conducta y podrían reducir la autonomía estadunidense en el futuro.
Palabras clave: Drogas, autonomía, institucionalismo, unilateralismo, bilateralismo, estrategias 
de estrangulación, Estados Unidos, México.  
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On February 2, 2012, U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder appeared before a congres-
sional committee to give testimony on the failed U.S. operation “Fast and Furious.” 
It was the sixth time in a year he had given testimony on the program, an ill-fated 
attempt to trace unlawfully purchased weapons from the U.S. into Mexico. He de-
nied authorizing the program or covering up later investigations. He called it “unac-
ceptable” and “stupid” (Huffington Post, 2012).
Fast and Furious was a program through which the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, 
Firearms and Explosives (atf) allowed an estimated 1 730 weapons to “walk” so they 
could be traced to cartels and other criminals (U.S. Congress, 2011: 5). Straw purchasers 
for drug cartels bought the weapons, and many were smuggled into Mexico. In fact, 
a number of murders were carried out with the weapons before they were recovered 
by the Mexican authorities (including a 2010 murder of a U.S. Border Patrol agent, 
Brian Terry), while others are still missing. Both Mexican leaders and frontline atf 
personnel criticized the operation as irresponsible and misguided, and U.S. Attorney 
General Eric Holder accepted that the operation was flawed in concept and execution.
Curiously, at the same time that atf field agents sanctioned this initiative, Mexi-
co and the U.S. achieved unprecedented levels of cooperation as a result of the Méri-
da Initiative. Mérida was a three-year plan designed to aid Mexico’s fight against 
drug trafficking organizations (dtos). Little had changed from the late 1990s, when 
Benjamin F. Nelson appeared before the U.S. Senate Caucus on International Narcot-
ics Control and listed a litany of failures by the Mexican government: the failure to 
institute programs, the failure to address issues of corruption, the failure to imple-
ment prescribed policies (U.S. Senate, 1999: 5).1 Yet the lack of progress had little 
bearing on the White House’s decision to recertify Mexico as “cooperating fully” 
with the United States.
A pattern has emerged in U.S.-Mexico relations on drug-related organized 
crime, beginning with U.S. frustration over lack of results, or poor performance by 
Mexican agencies. Of course, U.S. frustration is mirrored across the border, from the 
moment when President Nixon raised the stakes by employing military metaphors 
in describing the “war on drugs.” Mexico distrusts the United States because of its 
inability or unwillingness to reduce its huge consumer demand and its ineffective-
ness in stopping the export of arms to Mexican cartels. The stakes rose considerably 
for Mexico when the Caribbean route was closed down and cartels sought alterna-
tive land routes into the U.S., especially for cocaine. Mexico has also been frustrated 
1  It should be noted that the Mexican government did, however, extradite two Mexican national drug fugi-
tives to the United States in 1999. See U.S. Department of State, 2000: 1, 12; Storrs, 1997: 1; and Anderson 
and Farah, 1999: A01.
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by failures to deliver funding for the Mérida Initiative, U.S. interference in law en-
forcement operations, and limited technological transfers under Mérida. Likewise, 
some apparent successes in generating closer cooperation in drug policy have them-
selves produced various failures. Calderón’s military war on the drug cartels, for 
example, was supported by Washington, but has produced unprecedented levels of 
violence in Mexico and generated greater insecurity along the border.
We acknowledge that the U.S.-Mexico relationship over the issue of drug traf-
ficking is complex and controversial. We do not attempt to address the full panoply 
of bilateral issues and histories, but rather identify a pattern in the relationship: on 
the U.S. side, frustration leads to a unilateral U.S. policy that backfires, either be-
cause it fails spectacularly (as in Fast and Furious) or because it is resisted angrily by 
Mexico (as in certification). The U.S. then subsequently responds by agreeing to par-
ticipate in jointly-operated cooperative initiatives, which are far more effective for 
achieving its goals. 
What explains this puzzle, in which Mexico is repeatedly adjudged ineffective 
or disingenuous in the fight against drugs, yet is rewarded with cooperation? We 
contend that the United States has become a prisoner of a sovereignty dynamic of its 
own making in which unilateral action, whether successful or not, leads to an abro-
gation of the norm of bilateral cooperation, and an ensuing process of regulation that 
gradually constrains its behavior. Paradoxically, the unilateral assertion of sovereign 
prerogatives by the United States generates increased institutionalization –con-
straining future U.S. American behavior. Unilateralism thus initiates a cycle in which 
Mexico reacts defensively on the grounds that its sovereignty has been violated and 
seeks to limit U.S. room for maneuver. New agreements are reached and regulations 
signed (what we label “strangulation strategies”), and another policy area is created 
in which the United States has less latitude to act autonomously. U.S. American pol-
icy moves from “a messianic phase in which it claim[s] self-righteous leadership to a 
trough of self-doubt” and cooperation (Reich, 2010: 8).
In the following sections, we explore how the distinctions between forms of 
sovereignty outlined by Stephen Krasner in Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999) 
help frame an understanding of the cycle of unilateralism and cooperation. We then 
set out the logic of this approach in the context of the drug wars, and finally examine 
the empirical results of U.S.-Mexico interaction. Ultimately, our aim is to explain a 
major paradox in U.S. policy, to identify the types of policies that the United States 
might be able to implement, and specify the conditions under which such policies 
offer the prospect of success.
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the Logic of sovereignty And cooperAtion
Much of the debate about drug policy, as we have characterized it, concerns concep-
tions of the definition of sovereignty, the exercise of power, and the institutional 
context in which power is exercised. Elsewhere, we address in depth the theoretical 
weaknesses of realism in explaining this relationship (Reich and Aspinwall, 2013). In 
brief, one perspective believes that weak states are only able to prevail against stronger 
states if they have access to counterbalancing alliances or something highly valued by 
the larger state that they can use as leverage (Wohlforth, 1999; Baker Fox, 1959; Roth-
stein, 1982: 159-160). Mexico, however, is not a member of any global or regional orga-
nization that can dilute U.S. interference, nor can it effectively align with regional or glob-
al partners in a way that counterbalances U.S. America’s material advantages 
(Sanchez, 2003: 58; Vital, 1967). Others have claimed that weak states may prevail 
when favored by geography or greater resolve (Bjol, 1968). But drugs are a key securi-
ty issue for the U.S., with easy access to its neighbor from where the problem “origi-
nates.” 
Of central importance to us here is a key realist concept, that of sovereignty. In 
his book on that subject, Stephen Krasner discusses alternative uses of the term:
The term sovereignty has been used in four different ways –international legal sover-
eignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. 
International legal sovereignty refers to the practices associated with mutual recognition, 
usually between territorial entities that have formal juridical independence. Westphalian 
sovereignty refers to political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from 
authority structures within a given territory. Domestic sovereignty refers to the formal 
organization of political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to 
exercise effective control within the orders of their own polity. Finally, interdependence 
sovereignty refers to the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, 
ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state. (1999: 4)
We adopt Krasner’s variety of definitions for two reasons. First, we aim to im-
prove our understanding of the relationship between the exercise of power and the 
way in which that influences authority, legitimacy, and control. Utilizing these con-
cepts in dynamic rather than static terms may make the definitional distinctions more 
operationally useful. Second, we seek to apply these concepts to the issue of U.S.-
Mexican drug policies in the hope that they provide a heuristic framework that may 
help address a current and ongoing economic and security problem for the United 
States. We depict these varied conceptions of sovereignty in Figure 1.
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Source: Developed by the authors.
In this figure, we suggest that sovereignty can be disaggregated along two di-
mensions. Krasner’s ideal-types can be distinguished between its operational and its 
principled dimensions. Sovereignty has an instrumental, pragmatic purpose, because 
it enables states to establish and exert authority and control, to regulate and estab-
lish norms and rules. But states also invoke sovereignty as a principle, because that 
is how they establish themselves as entities. They seek recognition and recognize 
others by invoking or employing the concept of sovereignty. 
Our second distinction is between a unilateral (or imposed) and a negotiated (co-
operative or integrative) dimension. In this regard, states may act without the coop-
eration or recognition of other states in solving problems or establishing the princi-
ple of autonomous existence. Equally, they may work bilaterally or multilaterally 
when solving problems or establishing their sovereign right to exist (through the 
mechanism of mutual recognition). Krasner’s Westphalian sovereignty and domes-
tic sovereignty both imply unilateral decision-making processes. In contrast, inter-
dependent and international legal forms of sovereignty imply a negotiated exercise 
of power, requiring the cooperation of other states. 
AppLying this frAmework dynAmicALLy 
to mexicAn-u.s. drug poLicy
How do these distinctions operate in practice? We assume that both the U.S. and 
Mexico operate rationally, that their executives are constrained by domestic actors, 
but that they have transient preferences –that is, preferences that are more or less 
consistent from administration to administration. For the U.S., its primary prefer-
ence is to stem the flow of drugs. Although the problems associated with drug use in 
the U.S. (crime, violence, public health, etc.) could conceivably be mitigated by bet-
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ter treatment programs or stronger U.S. enforcement, the political costs are believed 
to be lower when the problem is externalized (to Mexico and other source countries). 
Mexico also wants to stem the flow of drugs. But maintaining domestic social order 
and protecting its sovereignty while retaining the benefits of the close relationship 
with the U.S. (through trade) are higher priorities.
Each executive operates under domestic constraints. The U.S. president is con-
strained by Congress (which consistently focuses on results in a division between 
hard-line “hawks” who favor unilateral security responses at the border, and 
“doves” who favor cooperative strategies), and by public opinion (on the potential 
contradictions between domestic and international policies see Putnam, 1988). Mex-
ico’s executive is also constrained by its Congress (which is divided between leftist 
intellectuals for whom autonomy is sacrosanct and a newer cosmopolitan cohort 
who favor cooperation), and by nationalist elites who avowedly oppose what they 
regard as opportunistic U.S. interference (Carrasco Araizaga, 2011; Esquivel, 2011). 
Public opinion generally favors U.S. involvement in the war on drugs and believes 
the current Mexican government has failed in that regard (González et al., 2011). 
The logic of action from the U.S. perspective is an operational, results-oriented 
one of problem-solving to placate public opinion through externalized action. Uni-
lateral solutions are preferred because Mexico is not fully trusted, though, in princi-
ple, the U.S. recognizes the advantage of a cooperative approach (Mares, 1992). The 
logic of action from the Mexican perspective is to resist U.S. unilateralism while ceding 
enough in terms of results –or the perception of sufficient results– to retain the benefits 
of its relationship with the U.S. Mexico’s strategy involves reducing the United States’ 
room for autonomous action through a process of institutionalization that we label 
“strangulation strategies.” 
There is thus an identifiable, regularized, and dynamic pattern to their interac-
tion that reflects Krasner’s varied ideal types. As U.S. American frustration with in-
effective results grows, so does the temptation to act unilaterally. A unilateral policy 
thrust (mainly following the domestic variant of sovereignty) designed to achieve 
specified policy goals has an unintended effect: a growing tendency by Mexico to 
focus on issues of sovereignty rather than drug eradication (Chabat, 1993; Reuter 
and Ronfeldt, 1992). Mexico responds with a Westphalian sovereignty strategy de-
signed to reassert its autonomy. The U.S., focusing on reducing the flow of drugs, 
has little option but to accede. What follows is the introduction of regulation primarily 
intended by Mexico to curtail future unilateral U.S. behavior. These “strangulation 
strategies” narrow the policy areas available for the autonomous exercise of U.S. pow-
er. Clearly, it is not Washington’s intent to adopt unilateral policies that will result in 
narrowing its subsequent policy options, but such is the unintended feedback effects 
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of these perverse strategies (on this process generally, see Pierson, 1993). Strangula-
tion combined with recognition that the problem of threat interdependence cannot 
be solved unilaterally leads to a new logic. Once the U.S. recognizes that the problem 
is one of interdependence rather than a matter of asserting domestic sovereignty, it 
formulates a bilateral strategy. From the two logics –of problem solving and resis-
tance– the U.S. and Mexico together arrive at a logic of cooperation.
Thus, the evident paradox –one whereby U.S. leaders can simultaneously speak 
of the success of certain operations and failure elsewhere– is explained by the dy-
namic that ensues in the aftermath of U.S. unilateralism, one in which Mexicans pro-
test and U.S. Americans agree to institute new regulations that primarily address the 
issue of U.S. American unilateralism rather than drug interdiction, and so ignores 
the underlying policy issue. Unilateral U.S. policy carries the seeds of its own future 
policy limitations and the inevitable prospect of reduced autonomy. The sovereignty 
cycle is complete.
Yet, the cycle we have identified, while most common, only occurs when the 
U.S. initiates a unilateral policy. There is also evidence of an alternative pattern than 
ensues when the process is initiated on a bilateral basis, attempting to address joint-
ly identified problems, founded on principles derived from international legal sov-
ereignty and employing regulations derived from interdependent sovereignty. The 
empirical evidence suggests that only this negotiated problem-solving approach 
generates more positive outcomes in the fight against drugs, recognizing that suc-
cess is a relative concept and that the implementation of coordinated initiatives is 
the nearest we can offer as a measure of success in an endless war.
conditions And cAses for drug erAdicAtion
We have outlined a common process and an alternative dynamic, But, how can this 
framework be employed empirically to distinguish between various operations and 
their corresponding programs? Do the four categories work in terms of identifying 
patterns of interaction and variation in results? Figure 2 extends our analytical frame-
work to distinguish a dozen U.S.-led drug interdiction initiatives relevant to drug 
interdiction over the last five decades. Some were unilateral, others negotiated. Equal-
ly, some were designed to solve problems, others to establish principles. Using these 
cases, we demonstrate that the framework offers valid distinctions between cases and 
is useful in describing their dynamics and consequences.
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Figure 2
DISTINGUISHING REGULATIONS AND PROGRAMS



















• 1988 un Drug Convention
• 1961, 1971 Conventions
Source: Developed by the authors.
Basing policy on both the principle of international sovereignty and also opera-
tional interdependent sovereignty is more likely to bring favorable results. The rea-
son is that effective cooperation requires that certain conditions be in place that over-
come transaction costs and lead to efficiency gains. We elaborate the conditions below. 
When the conditions are met, cooperation is more likely to be effective, as reflected 
in the cases listed in the top right hand box.
The first condition is the existence of mutual interest in the administration of any 
program. This is not the same thing, of course, as having the same interest. But any pro-
gram where Mexican authorities see no clear and significant reason for action is 
doomed to failure. Second, communication and coordination are essential. Programs 
must be coordinated not only across national sovereign jurisdictions but also within 
national administrative jurisdictions to avoid contradictory initiatives and to ensure 
that trust is not subverted. With so many federal agencies involved in drug interdic-
tion in Mexico, it is easy –if not inevitable– for individual agencies to pursue policies 
that contradict the efforts of other agencies, undermining cross-border efforts at co-
operation and adopting unilateral strategies to protect secrecy.
Third, institutionalization (that is, regularization of agreements, contacts, and 
communication between agencies and officials such as the High Level Consultative 
Group) is important because it commits bureaucratic personnel to regular interac-
tion with counterparts across the border, provides continuity, and overcomes shifts 
in political priorities (Aspinwall, 2009). Committing senior personnel to consultation 
increases each side’s stake and locks in stakeholders from both countries. Finally, ca-
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pacity-building facilitates cooperation because it increases and “tunes” skill levels. 
This can occur through the provision of resources and new technologies, such as 
equipment. It also occurs through training exercises, secondments, and placements, 
where personnel from one side are implanted in the other (Aspinwall 2013). The ap-
plication of new technologies and skills can generate mutual interest, and thus may 
help overcome prior coordination problems.
If these four conditions are met, a virtuous circle is created by expanding the 
area of mutual interest, engendering greater trust. This leads to higher levels of le-
gitimacy on both sides and can strengthen executives against domestic veto players. 
These conditions, although rare, are impossible to meet in the context of unilateral 
approaches. The cases that follow systematically consider these conditions in the 
context of different policy initiatives and examine the regulations that they generat-
ed. The requirements of a single article preclude us illustrating each case outlined in 
Figure 2. We therefore confine ourselves to examining one case in each box, leaving 
the remainder for a future, more detailed study.
four iLLustrAtive cAses
Unilateralism-Operational: The Case of Operation Casablanca
 The basic dynamic of U.S. unilateral operations and the Mexican response can be 
seen in three of the most prominent unilateral actions taken over the past several 
decades: Operation Intercept (1969), Operation Leyenda (1986, 1990), and Operation 
Casablanca (1998). We use the most recent of these, the notorious Operation Casa-
blanca, to illustrate this dynamic.
On May 16, 1998, 12 Mexican bankers were lured to Las Vegas at the invitation of 
“criminal associates,” for whom they had been laundering drug money but who were, 
in fact, undercover drug agents. The bankers were soon arrested, the culmination of a 
three-year undercover effort by the Clinton administration. Operation Casablanca, as 
it became known, led to the arrest of 160 people from six countries and from more 
than a dozen banks in Mexico and Venezuela, including the criminal indictment of 
three of Mexico’s largest banks –Bancomer, Serfin, and Confia– and 22 Mexican bank 
officials (Padgett, 1998; Carreno and Ferreyra, 1998). Customs agents also seized 
US$150 million in assets from Columbia’s Cali cartel and Mexico’s Juarez cartel. 
The operation caused considerable embarrassment to the Zedillo administra-
tion, not only because it revealed the depth of corruption in the already scandal-rid-
den banking system, but also because it was undertaken without the knowledge of 
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the Mexican government.2 The High Level Contact Group had been established be-
tween the two countries just two years earlier, as well as a Binational Drug Control 
Strategy (bdcS), which took effect in 1998 and supposedly “facilitated the decision-
making and agreement processes between both governments” (Binational Commis-
sion, n.d.). When Casablanca was launched in 1995, money laundering was not a 
crime in Mexico, reflecting inadequate controls over the banking sector, which had 
only been privatized in 1991 after a decade of government control. Lack of proper 
safeguards had become strikingly apparent in 1995, when it was discovered that 
Raúl Salinas, brother of former Mexican President Carlos Salinas, had used Citibank 
to shift more than US$100 million into Swiss and other foreign bank accounts.
In 1996, the Mexican government began implementing more serious anti-mon-
ey-laundering legislation that gave Mexico’s National Banking and Securities Com-
mission (cnbv) much greater authority over banks. By 1998, Mexico had criminalized 
money laundering and begun to monitor bank behavior much more closely. None-
theless, U.S. government estimates at the time were that more than US$15 billion in 
drug money was laundered annually in Mexico, a figure equal to roughly 5 percent 
of the gross domestic product (Padgett, 1998: 15). This figure, along with the fact that 
a number of high-ranking Mexican government and law-enforcement officials have 
been found guilty of working with drug cartels, convinced U.S. authorities that the 
details of Casablanca should not be shared with any Mexican officials. As the sting 
operation unfolded, it appeared that more than US$60 million had recently been 
laundered and that drug money was coming from a variety of sources, possibly in-
cluding Mexico’s defense minister, General Enrique Cervantes (Golden, 1999). 
Thus, U.S. authorities felt it necessary to send a signal to Mexico over its lax 
banking regulations, and the lack of full notification was a deliberate attempt to 
avoid leaks and protect the agents conducting the investigation. However, the back-
lash in both the Zedillo administration and Mexico’s Congress was furious. The 
chair of the Senate commission charged with responsibility for U.S.-Mexico rela-
tions, Martha Lara, called for the arrest of the U.S. customs agents responsible if they 
set foot in Mexico (Zavala and Fins, 1998). The Clinton administration’s request that 
five Mexican bankers be extradited to the United States in the wake of the Casablan-
ca Affair was not only refused by the Mexican government, but they also threatened 
to issue formal charges against the participating U.S. agents for violating Mexican 
sovereignty. Mexico’s Minister of Foreign Relations Rosario Green and Attorney 
General Jorge Madrazo formally protested the action (Garcia and Miselem, 1998). 
2  In fact, according to the Los Angeles Times, Mexico admitted that it had been informed of the operation two 
years before it occurred, although important details were not revealed, and, crucially, Mexico did not agree 
to U.S. agents operating on its soil (Kempster, 1998).
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Green went further, proposing that the United States adopt a “code of behavior” that 
would respect the territorial sovereignty of other countries (Ruiz, 1998). President 
Zedillo sent a letter of protest to the State Department and telephoned Clinton sug-
gesting that legal action would be taken (Padgett, 1998: 15).
Having impinged on Mexico’s sovereignty, Washington agreed to sign a new 
agreement on July 2, 1998, named the “Brownsville Letter.” Among other things, the 
Brownsville Letter called for better communications, coordination, and training in 
order to avoid future Casablanca-style incidents (U.S. Department of Justice, 1998: 
1-3). While the two sides recognized their shared interest in combating dtos, com-
munication and consultation on enforcement activities needed to be strengthened, 
and sovereignty better respected. They agreed to joint training of law enforcement 
officials in order to foster a better understanding of the respective legal systems and 
law enforcement practices. Thus, in addition to reinforcing its sovereignty, Mexico 
insisted on better communication and coordination. The two attorneys general, Reno 
and Madrazo, agreed to install a hotline between their offices and to provide ad-
vance notice of sensitive cross-border law enforcement activities (Kempster, 1998). 
A number of training exercises occurred in the wake of Casablanca, under the aus-
pices of the bdcS (Avalos-Pedraza, 2001).
The letter between the two attorneys general was converted into a memoran-
dum of understanding, the Mérida Agreement, when President Clinton visited Mex-
ico in February 1999. The arrangements specified under Brownsville/Mérida were 
intended to expire at the end of the Clinton administration. But Jeffrey Davidow, 
U.S. ambassador to Mexico, insisted that U.S. law enforcement agencies in the embassy 
continue to operate as though the agreement were in place, even after Bush took office 
(Davidow, 2007; U.S. Senate, 1999). As time went on, confidence grew in the Mexican 
authorities, and the U.S. passed information to Mexico in greater quantities, although 
Washington remained much concern about the corruption of Mexican officials.
However, as is evident in other cases in which U.S. unilateral action precedes a 
bilateral agreement, neither side was fully satisfied. Although the former U.S. direc-
tor of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, Barry McCaffrey, claimed in 2000 
that the level of intelligence-sharing cooperation rose dramatically (pbS, 2000a), U.S. 
border agents conducting operations or intelligence gathering found themselves ex-
tremely frustrated by the new consultation requirements, their cumbersome charac-
ter interfering with rapid responses to evolving situations on the ground.
We’re constantly having to notify. When you live and work on this border, people cross 
back and forth; it’s like the tide coming in and the tide going out. People cross this border 
four and five and six times a day. And to go through formal notifications every time to 
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track fast moving intelligence, it’s literally impossible. It’s very, very frustrating for the 
agents on the border to follow those procedures. (pbS, 2000b)
For their part, the Mexicans remained highly skeptical that the new accord would 
increase cooperation or curtail future sovereign violations (Castillo, 1998). The follow-
ing February, Clinton and Zedillo signed a more formal accord, the so-called “Méri-
da Agreement.” It imposed stricter regulations on U.S. behavior that curtailed the 
prospect of any future “Casablancas” (pgR, 2000: 49; Embajada de México, 1999). 
The Casablanca episode and its aftermath showed how the increasingly porous post-
nafta borders continued to reinforce both the importance of sovereignty and of trust. 
“The borders are disappearing. But they are not disappearing for law enforcement,” 
said Wilmer “Buddy” Parker, a former assistant U.S. attorney (cited in Zavala and 
Fins, 1998).
Unilateralism-Principled: 
The Failure of the Certification Process 
Despite their many differences and continued difficulties, Mexico had proven to be 
the U.S.’s most cooperative partner in the fight against drugs by 1985. According to 
Samuel I. del Villar, Mexico had signed “47 bilateral drug-related agreements with 
Washington; [had] the oldest, widest, and most effective eradication campaign; and 
[had] the largest foreign U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (dea) operation in 
its territory.” (1988: 191 and 206). Reuter and Ronfeldt note that, as of 1992, Mexico 
was the only country in Latin America that had permitted aerial spraying, which 
was strongly promoted by the United States (1992: 127). The Mexican government, 
however, apparently did not like to share information on its military drug control 
policies or their results, and Washington had become concerned over verification of 
Mexico’s anti-drug results, especially its eradication efforts. As a 1989 Congressional 
report stated, “Mexico remains the only country in which it is considered advisable 
to verify eradication efforts” (U.S. House of Representatives, 1989). Following the mur-
der of dea agent Enrique Camarena in 1985, and the unsuccessful closing of the border 
with “Operation Intercept II” in February 1986, the Reagan administration began to 
consider alternative “supply-side” strategies that would more effectively signal the 
extraterritorial extension of U.S. drug laws as well as pressure source countries to 
respond more seriously to Washington’s dictates. 
The U.S. Congress responded with the 1986 “Anti-Drug Abuse Act,” which made 
it illegal to produce or distribute drugs “with the intention of exporting them to U.S. 
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territory” (U.S. Congress, 1986). The Drug Act also allowed for U.S. federal grand 
jury indictments of foreign nationals. More significantly, the 1986 act linked future 
U.S. economic and military assistance, trade preferences, and support in multilateral 
institutions to source countries’ ability to clearly demonstrate they were “cooperating 
fully” with the United States in the drug war. The level of cooperation was to be de-
termined by the White House and then approved by the U.S. Congress through a 
“certification process.” Legally, Congress had to certify annually that all nations that 
were either drug producers or major drug-transit countries that were recipients of for-
eign assistance were cooperating fully with the United States in the drug war, as well 
as making serious efforts to deal with drug-related problems in their home countries. 
The emphasis on “full cooperation” as the main criterion for certification did 
not necessarily mean that the level of cooperation was to be determined solely by the 
results achieved by the source or transit country. Moreover, the president and Con-
gress could choose to totally ignore the criterion of cooperation if certification of the 
country was viewed as “vital to the national interest” of the United States. The stan-
dards for certification therefore gave Washington some degree of latitude in making 
its judgments. But having defined drug trafficking as a national security issue, the 
Reagan administration was clearly prepared to press countries like Mexico into em-
bracing U.S. strategy and tactics, while circumventing international treaties and 
conventions, through the certification process. Following the conditions established 
by the act, Reagan sent a warning shot when he withheld US$1 million in drug aid to 
Mexico in 1986 until he could report progress by Mexico in the Camarena murder 
case. The Reagan administration also pressured the Mexican government into clos-
ing down its highly corrupt Federal Security Directorate, which had had close ties to 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.
By contrast, Mexico regarded the certification process as a violation of its natio n-
al sovereignty because the act forced Mexico “to submit its police and military to the 
scrutiny, ‘certification,’ and ‘approval’ of the president and Congress of the United 
States” (Del Villar, 1988: 205; see also the Mexico City newspaper Excelsior, April 15, 
1988). The Mexican government did not question the right of the U.S. Congress to 
link certification to foreign assistance or to pass judgment on Mexico’s domestic pol-
icies, although the act also required that the U.S. representatives vote against multi-
lateral bank loans to any decertified country. From the Mexican perspective, certifica-
tion demonstrated an obvious lack of respect with regard to its commitment to the 
drug war, which only served to damage the bilateral relationship. Moreover, certifi-
cation appeared at times to be highly arbitrary, as evident from the certification of 
Noriega’s Panama when both drug running and money laundering in that country 
were well-known facts in Washington (Hersh, 1986). The law also “legally” threatened 
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to disrupt Mexican-U.S. trade (Del Villar, 1988: 200). Finally, the certification process 
was damaging because it created a forum for criticizing foreign governments and, 
therefore, undermined efforts toward international cooperation (Tello Peon, 1996: 
137). But certification was useful from Washington’s perspective because it focused 
attention on foreign supply rather than domestic demand. 
Even if the Mexican government did not like the certification process, it clearly 
spurred it to take more aggressive action. At the time that the 1986 law was passed, 
officials in Washington held the view that the Mexican government “would rather 
destroy plants than catch people. The [Mexican] Government appears unable or un-
willing to arrest and/or prosecute the major narcotics traffickers that are involved in 
production, processing, and distribution of narcotics” (U.S. House of Representa-
tives, 1987). However, Mexico began to make dramatic arrests and drug seizures as 
the annual certification process was underway in the U.S., in what became known in 
Washington as the “February surprise.” In 1987 and 1988, Mexico received certifica-
tion just as it has every year, but only after considerable internal debate, and in both 
years, Congress seriously considered overriding the president’s initial approval be-
cause of its belief that the Mexican government was not sufficiently committed to 
fighting the drug war and because of its seeming inability to deal with domestic cor-
ruption. In 1987, a House resolution was passed that disapproved certification for 
Mexico, and in 1988 a Senate resolution was passed to decertify Mexico, but in both 
cases the resolutions failed to get adequate congressional support (Perl, 1988: 25-34; 
Walker, 1995).
In the 1990s, however, the Mexican government made a more concerted effort to 
meet U.S. Congressional concerns and arrested both major traffickers and corrupt 
government officials. In March 1996, on the day that the Clinton administration was 
to announce whether to certify Mexico, Mexican troops swept through Tijuana in an 
attempt to capture the Arellano Felix brothers, leaders of the Tijuana cartel. After it 
was announced that Mexico had received certification, the troops ceased their pur-
suit. In February 1997, the Mexican government announced the arrest of General 
Gutiérrez Rebollo on charges of drug corruption. As the director of the National In-
stitute to Combat Drugs, he allegedly had links to drug lord Amado Carrillo. The 
timing of the government’s announcement could not have been more favorable in 
swaying Washington toward certifying Mexico for the coming year. Even so, Clinton 
had a difficult time justifying Mexico’s certification, and Congress forced the presi-
dent to make an additional presentation in September 1997.3 The problem was due 
3  The September report was to include further evaluations on dismantling drug-smuggling organizations and 
progress in strengthening ties between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies (Los Angeles Times, 1997).
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partly to the failure of the Mexican government to capture the country’s most want-
ed drug trafficker, Amado Carrillo, by early 1997. Moreover, Humberto Garcia 
Ábrego, the brother of Gulf Cartel boss Juan Garcia Ábrego, was able to walk out of 
prison where he was in custody on the day that Clinton was to announce Mexico’s 
certification, and no local authority could provide a clear explanation of the incident. 
Even more remarkably, the Mexican government withheld news of Garcia Ábrego’s 
release until after Clinton approved the certification (Anderson and Moore, 1999). 
The congressional debate on certification in early 1999 is especially noteworthy, 
as it appeared that the Mexican government had made very little progress during 
1998 in dealing with either drugs or corruption. Statistical evidence supported this 
view, and even some Mexican officials were inclined to agree. Drug arrests had fallen, 
drug investigations were down by 19 percent from 1997, and seizures of cocaine, mari-
juana, and heroin had decreased from the previous year (Anderson and Farah, 1999). 
Drug interdiction seemed to be less effective than in 1997, even though the Mexican 
government was spending approximately US$770 million on its anti-drug programs 
and had more than 26 000 soldiers and government personnel involved in the drug war. 
Of course, lower statistical measurements may have also been the result of more effec-
tive law enforcement, as some Mexicans argued, which was resulting in traffickers 
altering their shipping routes to the Caribbean rather than overland through Mexico. 
Yet there was also evidence to suggest lower statistical measures had less to do 
with efficiency and more to do with corruption. In September 1998, a special Mexican 
army anti-drug unit,4 whose leadership was trained by U.S. Special Forces and the 
cia, was removed from their duties at Mexico City’s airport due to their alleged in-
volvement in illegal drug and immigration rings. Additional U.S.-trained Mexican 
law enforcement officers were charged in 1998 with using a government plane to ship 
cocaine (Farah and Moore, 1998). Also disturbing was the fact that no major Mexican 
drug dealer had ever been extradited to the United States up to that time, new money 
laundering laws had resulted in only one conviction, and high level corruption in 
government and in elite anti-drug units appeared to be as pervasive as ever. Not sur-
prisingly, the U.S. Congress was completely divided on certifying Mexico for 1999.
By February 1999, however, the Mexican government had begun the process of 
bringing charges against Mario Villanueva, the governor of the state of Quintana 
Roo, who had allegedly been a “protector” for the Juarez cartel on the Yucatán Pen-
insula, which was a major transit point for Columbian drugs. Villanueva subsequent-
ly went into hiding and was believed to have fled the country. He was later arrested 
4  The special anti-drug unit was created in 1997 in an attempt to reform the corruption-riddled federal law 
enforcement agency. It consisted of 100 investigators and officers and was part of an elite anti-drug agency 
known as the Organized Crime Unit, operating within the Attorney General’s Office.
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and extradited (in 2010) to the U.S. Also in February 1999, the Mexican government 
announced a new US$400 million, three-year plan to increase the funding and tech-
nical capabilities of its anti-drug efforts. Soon afterwards, the U.S. Congress certified 
Mexico for another year. 
Despite economic and military action, Mexico seemed incapable of addressing 
serious institutional problems of corruption, and therefore had only marginal suc-
cess in meeting U.S. objectives as set out in the 1986 Drug Act. Although the Mexican 
government made a major arrest or drug seizure at a timely moment to help the White 
House justify certification, ultimately the U.S. government had very little choice in 
the matter, even when the drug situation deteriorated. Not to certify Mexico would 
have disrupted trade relations and sent markets into a downward spiral, the effects 
of which would be felt throughout the hemisphere.
Members of the U.S. Congress became quite cynical about the “certification pro-
cess.” Senator Christopher Dodd argued that “if we were to subject our own nation 
to this very test we apply to other countries, we wouldn’t pass it” (cited in Andreas, 
2000: 70). Similarly, former Senator Carol Mosely-Braun declared the “certification 
process had nothing to do with the truth about narcotics enforcement.” Senator Rob-
ert Bennett went even further in his criticism. As he explained, “The certification 
process is a joke, if the purpose is to determine what is going on in Mexico....We can’t 
de-certify Mexico. We have to lie about what is going on because our relationship 
with Mexico is so important that we can’t let it go down the tubes” (both quotes are 
from Andreas, 2000: 71). Dodd attempted to have Congress reexamine the law, but 
with little success.   
The “certification process” appeared, then, to have another purpose, which was 
to create a forum for criticism of countries involved in the drug war and therefore to 
embarrass them into taking more effective action. But rather than leading to more 
effective strategies, like all unilateral strategies it poisoned relations between the 
United States and Mexico, and made it more difficult to create the necessary condi-
tions for cooperative and integrative solutions. Recognizing these problems, the 
Mexican government pressured the United States into including in their Mérida 
Agreement of February 1999 a new set of Performance Measures of Effectiveness 
(pmes). The pmes were the first attempt by the two countries “to establish objective 
criteria to jointly assess their progress” in anti-drug efforts (pgR, 2000: 48). This is an 
example of the “strangulation” policy response by Mexico to limit the principled 
unilateralism of the U.S., in this case of the drug certification process.
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Integrative-Principled: From The Hague 
And the Global to the oAs and the Regional
Among the oldest approaches to dealing with illicit international drug flows is the 
creation of drug regimes, representing attempts by participating countries to work 
together based on shared principles, information, and strategies that are clearly em-
bodied in formal rules and decision-making procedures. Drug regimes often expressed 
mutual interest, and they provided some means of institutionalization and commu-
nication. But coordination (especially on enforcement) and capacity-building have 
largely been absent. Thus, they have rarely brought results or elicited more than to-
ken political support. 
More than 100 years ago, Washington recognized the growing dangers of the opi-
um trade with Asia and organized multilateral efforts to curtail its flow (Bruun, Pan, 
and Rexed, 1975; Taylor, 1969), along with complementary domestic legislation dat-
ing from 1909 (Walker, 1981: 15; Taylor, 1969: 130-2). It has consistently encouraged 
Mexico to join the new international regimes, which the latter did from the 1912 Inter-
national Opium Convention in The Hague. This established the central principle of 
the international drug control regime to this day, limiting the production and use of drugs 
solely for medical and scientific purposes (Taylor, 1969: 110-1; United Nations, 1987: 63). 
Subsequent Mexican cooperation was conditioned because it did not want “to expose 
to international scrutiny anything that might detract from the accomplishments of the 
Revolution,” yet it adopted strict measures that gave it “a drug control system exceeded 
in the Western Hemisphere only by that of the United States” (Walker, 1981: 45, 49). 
Even so, it was not committed to working closely with the United States, refusing to 
participate in the 1923 Pan American Conference, where the United States had urged 
the ratification and implementation of the 1912 Hague Convention. Washington re-
fused to recognize that the Obregón government in Mexico had created a major ob-
stacle to cooperation, with little trust having being established on the drugs issue.
From these early unsuccessful efforts at folding the bilateral relationship on drugs 
into a broader “principled” effort, a succession of ensuing initiatives followed. Each 
foundered, as ill-advised U.S. efforts to assert dominance were followed by Mexican 
withdrawal and a subsequent focus on bilateral relations. The first cycle of withdraw-
al began in 1925 and lasted until 1930 (Taylor, 1969: 197-209 and Chapter 8).5 Among 
the Latin American countries that were important for drug control, only Mexico had 
made a serious effort to limit drug-related activity in this early period, even negoti-
5  It should be noted that the United States did continue to cooperate with some regimes, such as the League 
of Nations’ Opium Advisory Committee, whose work dealt mostly with China and other Asian countries 
in this period (Walker 1993-94: 43).
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ating a multilateral extradition treaty with the U.S. and other Latin American coun-
tries in 1926 (Taylor, 1969: 290; Walker, 1981: 22, 35-7). 
Mexico continued to pursue multilateral solutions itself and joined the first major 
drug regime in Geneva in 1931, which was the Convention to Limit the Manufacture 
and Regulate the Distribution of Narcotics. The terms of the Geneva regime reflected 
the view that the best way to deal with the problem of illegal production and distribu-
tion was by going to “the source” country itself, a policy favored by the U.S. (United 
Nations, 1987). Mexico predictably resisted this U.S. initiative, refusing to acknowl-
edge that there was a problem of illicit drugs in Mexico, although domestic newspa-
pers reported to the contrary (Walker, 1981: 70-71, 79-83).
Various drug regimes were created after World War II, such as the Paris Protocol 
of 1948 and the 1953 Protocol on Opium, but they did little to reverse illicit drug flows. 
In 1961, the United Nations General Assembly approved the Single Convention on 
Narcotics, which the United States did not ratify until 1967. Further conventions fol-
lowed in the early 1970s, strengthening the U.S. position that cultivation and produc-
tion were the primary causes of illicit drug flows and could be strategically dealt 
with independently of market or demand conditions (Bruun, Pan, and Rexed, 1975: 
243-68). But with the onus and costs of the resulting drug strategies falling primarily 
upon producer countries, they proved ineffective.6 As Jack Donnelly noted, “Effective 
international action against drug trafficking would require relinquishing control 
over parts of the national law enforcement machinery. Virtually no state is likely to 
find this acceptable, given the centrality of the police power to the very idea of sov-
ereignty” (Donnelly, 1992: 302). 
Given that they tend to focus solely on production and supply, while overlook-
ing consumption and demand, the drug regimes may have inadvertently driven up 
prices and ensured the huge growth in the drug market in the United States in the 
1960s and 1970s (Del Villar 1989: 139). By 1988, the United States seemed to have ac-
knowledged some of these underlying problems by giving support to the United 
Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic and Psychotropic Substances 
(Nadelmann, 1990: 503; Donnelly, 1992: 291). The 1988 Convention criminalized illicit 
trading in precursor chemicals and the laundering of assets, and called for legisla-
tion to permit governments to seize ill-gotten gains. By 1993 more than 72 countries 
had ratified the 1988 UN Convention (Walker 1993-94: 64). 
Over the years, there have been periods of a convergence of interests between 
the United States and Mexico, thereby leading to the creation of and support for drug 
6  As David R. Mares has pointed out, this strategy allows the United States to lessen its domestic costs while 
shifting the burden to producing countries (1992: 333). 
25
The Paradox of UnilaTeralism
essays
regimes. Yet, most of these regimes have arisen from fundamentally different under-
lying concerns and so have not endured. For Mexico, the most salient issue was to 
have a drug regime that would constrain or limit U.S. actions; for the United States, 
the motive was more to enhance its international legitimacy, though Washington also 
benefited from the fact that regimes placed the burden on source countries. Indepen-
dently of U.S. influence, the Salinas administration forged a number of multilateral 
agreements in the late 1980s, and, most importantly, signed the 1988 Vienna Conven-
tion. In the early 1990s, Mexico signed a series of bilateral agreements with other 
Latin American countries, including Guatemala, El Salvador, Colombia, and Vene-
zuela, that were nominally aimed at improving intelligence-gathering, but in fact 
were aimed at preventing and/or regulating U.S. activities. 
Mexico saw the advantages of multilateral cooperative efforts that were inde-
pendent of U.S. participation. In 1993, Salinas called on Central and South American 
countries to develop new multilateral efforts toward fighting drugs that promised to 
protect the national sovereignty of individual countries (Tello Peon, 1996: 127). Mex-
ico’s intent was to establish an international legal framework beyond U.S. control. 
By early 2000, Mexico had signed 21 cooperative agreements to combat drugs 
with other Latin American and Caribbean countries. But regional regimes, like the 
1990 Declaration of Ixtapa or the 1996 Anti-Drug Strategy in the Hemisphere, have 
been plagued by the same problems that have limited the Un Conventions: a lack of 
financial resources, enforcement mechanisms, and political support from member 
states. 
Despite the generally understood need for multilateral solutions, the control of 
illicit flows introduces a whole new set of problems and issues that states have been 
reluctant to address because of their obvious implications for national sovereignty. 
Moreover, the United States, given its failure to lead effectively in formulating global 
regimes, has been hesitant to take the lead in the creation of hemispheric drug re-
gimes because of its belief that bilateral strategies allowed Washington greater con-
trol and authority over its partners. It should be noted, however, that in 1999 the Or-
ganization of American States Inter-American Commission on Drug Abuse Control 
(oaS/cicad) did begin developing a Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism (mem) (U.S. 
Department of State, 2000: 47-8, 608; pgR, 2000: 3, 64-5). The mem is a hemispheric 
peer review system intended to evaluate each oaS member state’s anti-drug strate-
gies and efforts. Its first evaluations appeared in April 2001, but to date it has not re-
sulted in greater hemispheric cooperation.
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Integrative-Operational: The Mérida Initiative
Several cases fit into this category, as outlined in Figure 2, including Operation Con-
dor, a massive eradication campaign against heroin and marijuana that began in the 
mid-1970s, Operation Falcon (also known as the “Northern Border Response Force”), 
and the Mérida Initiative. In these cases, our four conditions of mutual interest (clear 
communication and coordination, institutionalization, and capacity building) are 
met. Again, space limitations preclude us exploring each case, and so we focus on the 
Mérida Initiative, the largest, longest, and arguably most important of these cases.
The militarization of the war against the Mexican drug trafficking organizations (dtos) 
reached new heights following Calderón’s election in 2006. Some 40 000 military troops 
and 5 000 federal police were drafted to conduct operations within two years of his tak-
ing office (González, 2009: 74; Olson, Shirk, and Selee, 2010). The stakes for the U.S. remain 
significant, and the rationale for U.S. American support for Mexico is clear: U.S. interests 
are harmed by the instability, violence, and crime in Mexico because of the threat of 
spillover to U.S. soil and the impact it may have on immigration as Mexicans flee the 
violence. The 2009 U.S. National Drug Assessment Threat report claimed that dtos 
“represent the greatest organized crime threat to the United States” (cited in Vulliamy, 
2010: xxviii). The weaker the Mexican state is, the more likely it is that crime will spread.
Cooperation with the U.S. grew considerably under Calderón. A traditional 
arm’s-length interaction has given way to close coordination on extraditions and other 
criminal proceedings. The U.S. responded with the Mérida Initiative, a joint effort 
with Mexico (and several Central American countries) to combat drug trafficking, in 
which about US$1.5 billion was provided for Mexico. Most of these resources were 
targeted at counteracting the violent dtos by providing the Mexican security forces 
(military and police) with equipment and training.
Mérida represents the most important formal cooperation agreement on drugs 
between the two countries since the Binational Drug Control Strategy was signed in 
1998, which funded programs to counter drug production and trafficking, strengthened 
the rule of law, and began systematically addressing the problem of money laundering. 
It marked the beginning of an improvement in cooperation levels, though results 
were mixed and corruption continued to pose an obstacle to effectiveness (U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office, 2007). Mérida’s funding ended in 2010, although the 
Obama administration has continued to seek monies for its programs. It has empha-
sized the importance of joint responsibility, sovereignty, and partnership –as equals–, 
all of which are important to Mexico. 
Mérida was criticized for not addressing capacity-building and institutional re-
form (Ribando Seelke and Finklea, 2011). Thus, the post-Mérida strategy (known as 
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Beyond Mérida, announced in March 2010) is noteworthy in that it extends coopera-
tion beyond a hard-security (military and police) response to drug trafficking. It in-
cluded four pillars: disrupting organized criminal groups; institutionalizing the rule 
of law; building a twenty-first-century border; and building strong and resilient 
communities. It represents a dramatic increase in support for civil society and insti-
tutional capacity-building through training programs for law enforcement and public 
engagement, among other things. The strategy represents an acknowledgement of the 
need for resources, cooperation, and multiple strategies in the fight against dtos.
Both Obama and Calderón have fully supported cooperation. In April 2011, the 
U.S. and Mexico agreed to increase joint intelligence gathering (dBuneNews, n.d.). 
In 2010, dhS signed an agreement with the Mexican Ministry of Public Security (SSp) 
to extend cooperation in joint border patrols in Arizona. ice and cbp have an agreement 
with Mexican counterparts to allow prosecutions that are declined by federal prosecu-
tors in the U.S. to be taken up by Mexico’s federal Attorney General’s office (pgR). 
The U.S. is providing funding for judicial training, and also for state and local police, 
beginning in the state of Chihuahua. Its purpose is to “develop a standard curriculum 
for state and municipal police officers; to provide equipment, training, and advisors 
to state and municipal forces; and to help create a major crimes task force comprised 
of federal and state police” (Ribando Seelke and Finklea, 2011: 16 n. 75). USaid and 
the Department of Justice are supporting judicial and legal reform at state and fed-
eral levels. cbp is helping establish a customs training academy in Mexico.
The two sides have also cooperated in recent years on gun smuggling and mon-
ey laundering. Estimates from the Mexican authorities place the number of U.S.-origin 
weapons seized in Mexico at 60 000 between 2007 and 2009 (Olson, Shirk, and Selee, 
2010: 16). However, in some cases the lack of information sharing and unilateral ac-
tion have led to problems. In Operation Gunrunner, for example, the atf was criti-
cized for inconsistent information sharing with Mexican and U.S. agencies alike. It 
now maintains an office in Mexico City to provide Mexican officials with informa-
tion from its eTrace gun-tracking program. In addition, ice is in charge of Operation 
Armas Cruzadas, a multi-agency effort to counter gun smuggling at the border. To 
address money laundering, ice and the cbp created Operation Firewall in 2005 to in-
tercept illicit money shipments from the U.S. to Mexico. The two countries also cre-
ated a Bilateral Money Laundering Working Group to coordinate efforts aimed at 
investigating and prosecuting money laundering and smuggling (Ribando Seelke 
and Finklea, 2011). 
The militaries from the two sides are now slowly increasing cooperation, too, an 
unprecedented move for the Mexican military. Training and secondment of Mexi-
cans to the U.S. have grown as a result of the increasing interaction of the Mexican 
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military with its civilian counterparts, and also because of a growing understanding 
between the U.S. and Mexico on the need to cooperate (Ai Camp, 2010). Since Méri-
da, U.S. agencies have increased their presence and activities in Mexico dramatical-
ly. Reports from Mexico indicate that arrests are up. In the 11 years from 1995 to 2005 
(inclusive), there were 216 extraditions. In the five years from 2006 to 2010, there 
were 442. An anonymous Mexican government official stated that given the results, 
there was no reason for Mexico to oppose the presence of U.S. officials in Mexico 
(Esquivel, 2011). Thus, while sovereignty remains a concern, sensitivities can be 
ameliorated by paying careful attention to them and by strong results. 
The U.S.’s acceptance of responsibility fostered trust. In addition to sharing an 
interest in outcomes, the Obama administration recognized that the U.S. shares re-
sponsibility for the problem of organized crime, including drug consumption, arms 
trafficking, and money laundering. Internal coordination and cooperation are also 
essential for effective cooperation. Incomplete access to federal data hampers coordi-
nation among federal, state, and local authorities, and some states have enacted more 
stringent gun tracing measures than others. Interagency and intra-agency cooperation 
have grown, but are also hampered by budget uncertainties and competition for 
funding, most of which is funneled through the State Department’s Bureau of Inter-
national Narcotics Affairs and Law Enforcement for security operations (Shirk, 2011). 
The provision of resources for capacity building is also important. According to 
USaid officials based in Mexico City, U.S. expertise in law enforcement is key even if 
the level of funding is not very high (Capò and Real, 2011). The pgR also works close-
ly with counterparts in the U.S., particularly in the Department of Justice and the 
Narcotics Affairs Section in State, to improve its performance. According to reports 
in the Mexican press, some nine U.S. civilian and military agencies have offices in 
Mexico and work on drug interdiction as a result of Calderón’s commitment to the 
drug war, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, Homeland Security, National 
Security Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the fbi, the dea, the atf, Coast 
Guard Intelligence, and the Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes. The most 
recent available figures suggest that about 500 U.S. agents in total now work in Mex-
ico, up from 60 in 2005, and 227 in the first year of Calderon’s presidency (Carrasco 
Araizaga, 2011; Esquivel, 2011). From 2006 onward, a total of 54 agents from the dea 
alone operated in Mexico, with the consent of the Mexican government. 
dea agents now operate alongside the pgR. They participate in arrests and inter-
rogations and are able to collect and safeguard information. dea agents allegedly con-
duct interrogations at the Assistant Attorney General’s Office for Special Investigations 
of Organized Crime (Siedo) and the pgR (Carrasco Araizaga, 2011). Other participating 
or supporting agencies in Mexico include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRe) and 
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the SSp. Ironically, despite the worsening violence in Mexico, what Mérida shows is 
that an integrated-operational effort involving negotiated problem-solving strate-
gies can deliver some strong results (measured as extraditions, capacity-building, 
seizures, etc.) without compromising the relationship between the two countries.
concLusion
A dynamic has emerged between the two countries that goes far to explain U.S. strat-
egies and Mexican responses. Over time, and through trial and error, the United 
States and Mexico have developed a working –if inconsistent– relationship in deal-
ing with illicit drug flows across the border. The so-called “rules of the game” are quite 
different for each side. If the United States is to gain the cooperation of the Mexican 
government in the drug war, it must respect Mexican sovereignty. Quite simply, pro-
tecting its sovereignty is Mexico’s most fundamental interest and its national securi-
ty priority. Any unauthorized violation of that sovereignty will not be tolerated.
Whenever the United States has transgressed, particularly in its unilateral drug 
strategies, the Mexican government has been quick and blunt in its response and has 
attempted to “strangle” or preclude any recurrence. Such transgressions need not be 
merely territorial violations, for they may also be any act that undermines the inter-
nal or external legitimacy of the state. As Reuter and Ronfeldt explained, “The limits 
are apparently breached when the [U.S.] activity jeopardizes the revolutionary mys-
tique and Mexico’s image at home and abroad, embarrasses Mexican leaders in 
power, weakens the central government or party control in some significant area, or 
get subordinated to non-Mexican actors” (1992: 11). As the discussion of Washington’s 
unilateral policies has shown, they frequently do weaken and embarrass the Mexi-
can government, and they always provoke a vigorous response.
A repeated problem is that Washington is frequently frustrated by the Mexican 
government’s lack of commitment and effort in carrying out its responsibilities in the 
anti-drug crusade. Of course, the United States holds Mexico to an unreasonably high 
standard of behavior in the drug war –one that the United States would, in most years, 
fail to measure up to itself. However, because of widespread corruption throughout the 
government and the prevailing sense that this is an “unwinnable war,” the Mexican 
government has demonstrated a high tolerance for drug activity within its country, as 
long as it does not challenge the authority of the state or embarrass the government.7 
7  As Andreas notes, the Mexican crackdown on drug smugglers during the Salinas administration was 
“highly selective,” focusing on the so-called “old guard” who had ties to Colombia’s Medellin cartel, while 
allowing others to expand their operations (2000: 61-4). 
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It should be emphasized that the illicit drug industry in Mexico has become so 
important that if it were to be fully shut down, the Mexican economy would undoubt-
edly suffer severe shocks.8 As the former personal adviser to Mexico’s attorney general 
has asserted, Mexico’s drug traffickers have become “driving forces, pillars even, of 
our economic growth.”9 Even so, when the national government has been threatened or 
embarrassed, it has inevitably taken strong action against drug kingpins and their 
organizations. Such aggressiveness is aimed not only at reestablishing the legiti-
mate authority of the state, but also at projecting the appropriate image of “cooperative 
partner” to Washington. On the other hand, the United States recognizes the wide-
spread corruption, and at times complicity,10 of the Mexican government in its han-
dling of the drug problem. But there are also limits to U.S. tolerance, and when they 
have been exceeded, the United States has chosen to act forcefully and/or unilaterally, 
even though this has usually hurt U.S.-Mexican relations and, as we have demonstrat-
ed, often proven to be counterproductive when conducted unilaterally.
The drug certification process was a striking example of this counter-productive-
ness. Once the certification process was adopted in a fit of rage after the Camarena as-
sassination, policymakers quickly discovered there was no going back; that it was 
virtually impossible to change the new law for fear of appearing “soft on drugs” (Andreas, 
2000: 48). But it was also impossible to de-certify Mexico because of its close economic 
and geographic ties to the United States. To de-certify Mexico would trigger a crisis on 
both sides of the border that would have grave economic and political repercussions 
for both countries.11 Mexico knew this and acted with a certain level of impunity re-
garding U.S. judgments. It was able to supply the appropriate statistics of arrests and 
seizures to Washington to ensure certification, even if it made no real headway in the 
drug war. It also hired three major Washington lobbying firms to smooth the process 
and project the correct image of “cooperative partner” to Congress. 
 The certification process finally ended in 2002, and the U.S. moved toward a 
well-funded cooperative program under Mérida that fit the rubric of an integrative, 
multilateral solution. Mérida has shown that such approaches work far more effec-
8  As Nora Lustig has added, “The attempt to change the rules of the game too swiftly could trigger a wave 
of capital outflows large enough to threaten the fragile recovery [of the late 1990s]” (cited in Andreas, 1996: 
165; see also Lustig, 1996; and Naylor, 1987).
9  The official, Eduardo Valle, resigned in protest in May 1994. His statement is taken from Mexican Insights 
(1995: 45).
10  An example of U.S. understanding of Mexican government complicity was starkly demonstrated imme-
diately after the Camarena assassination when the U.S. ambassador to Mexico, John Gavin, provided a 
detailed and shocking description of the drug business in that country (cited in Walker 1995: 396; see also 
Shannon 1988: 204-213).
11  Few countries have been fully de-certified by the United States, and those were usually countries like Iran 
and Syria, which the United States had few important ties to.
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tively than unilateral action. The United States appears to have accepted that its nar-
row strategic approach of attacking only the source is counter-productive, sacrific-
ing the credibility and goodwill of its most important anti-drug partner. The key 
message for policymakers is that identifying strategies that build on mutual interest, 
create channels of communication and coordination (both internally and cross-bor-
der), regularize contact, and build capacity will have a greater chance of success, be-
cause expectations will converge and trust will be built.
Over the years, the failure of U.S. unilateral policies and their ensuing Mexican 
strangulation responses have narrowed U.S. policy options. This has, in effect, forced 
the United States and Mexico into alternative strategies, which have produced closer 
and more cooperative efforts. The 1998 Bi-National Drug Strategy and its related 
Performance Measures of Effectiveness redefined the guidelines for both countries 
in combating drug trafficking. Procedures for cooperation between law enforcement 
agencies were further reinforced with the Brownsville Letter and Mérida Agreement. 
Mexico and the United States also supported the creation of an oaS multilateral drug 
regime with its Multilateral Evaluation Mechanism. Whether the new post-Mérida 
Initiative will take hold and allow the United States to escape the perverse logic of 
its past strategies is a question that only time will tell. The development of these new 
strategies is certainly indicative of the failure of past U.S. drug policies, but unfortu-
nately they are not necessarily indicative of future success.
The broader lesson to be drawn from this article is that the use of compulsory 
power unilaterally may have great political appeal at home, but it is often counter-
productive, both in achieving U.S. America’s stated policy goals at the time and, just 
as importantly, in constraining its future options. The inevitable cycle, over time, leads 
the United States, the apparently dominant partner, to be further boxed in every time 
it enacts policy unilaterally. Ironically, perhaps, it ends up eschewing its own sover-
eignty and not Mexico’s.
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